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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
I'll ml ill/Appellee,
( ,isi' Nn MMM1IW0 < A

vs.
MICHAEL LEROY MARTINEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
I- I- *

-•• iniSDICTION AND II III! Ill IIUI RE OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant appeals from, the interlocutory order of] udge John R. Morris in the
Utah Second Distiict Court, Weber County, denying defendant's motion to suppress
evidence in a luminal prosecution, i -.L> e^uu nas jurisdiction undu Liah L ^ J I
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ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1 Did Utah Code Ann. t$ 4 i -t>-1 tmi W es t 2ui>4 MI p. aled, 2005) limit a police
o 11 icn's authority to arrosl IOI misdemeanor (railU \ uilations:'1

correctness. See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT ±02, R x^, 37 l\3d 1103.

1

The legislature repealed section 41-6-166 during the 2005 legislative session.
See 2005 Utah Laws 209. '

2. Did defendant's resistance to an allegedly unlawful arrest constitute a
new, distinct crime for which he was lawfully arrested and searched incident
thereto?
Standard of Review. This issue is raised for the first time on appeal as an
alternate ground on which to affirm the trial court. Thus, no standard of review
applies. This Court may affirm on an alternate ground so long as the ground is
apparent in the record. State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96,117 n.4,89 P.3d 185.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) (repealed 2005), attached as
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with various drug and weapon offenses
including possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, resisting arrest, and running a red light
(R. 1-2). Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered pleas of
not guilty (R. 21-22,23-24).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drug and drug paraphernalia
evidence seized during a search incident to his arrest for a traffic violation (R. 3031). He asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) governs arrests for
2

f ra f 111 \r i i > 1 o fi n 11 s a n (I 111,11 h i' >, 11' rest for r 111 I 11 i n ^ < i n M 1 1 i ght i/v as not ai ithorizerf b y

that section (R. 30-31).
After a hearing and briefing, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 4959). Tt ruled that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-166 did not limit the authority of police to
arrest a person for a traffic offense, u v^iiiy prescribed pri^edures the police must
fol l()i x oi Lee tl ie) n lake sucl L ai i ai rest (R 55 56).
I Wend.in I lilrd i prlihon iiini 111 ^ Ulnh Siipuvmr < mill 1 ni pennisM iiiii 1

appeal the trial court's denial oi lab suppression motion (R, 65). That court
transferred the case to this court pursuant to its transfer authority in Ltah eodc
Ann, § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004) (R. 69). Defendant's petition raised the same claim he
asserted m I he trial court—ihut iiibdiivht tor atraffu \ lulduon was unlaw ml under

t
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l s s u e Q£ £|rsj. i m p r e s s ion that warranted interlocutory review. This Court granted
defendant's petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, were surveilling a suspected drug house
from unmarked police vehicles in a school parking lot (R. 79:10-11,28). The agents
observed some short-term traffic to the house, including defendant on a motorcycle
3

(R. 79:11). A few minutes after arriving at the house, defendant returned to his
motorcycle and drove across the street to the school parking lot opposite the house
(R. 79:12,29). He circled the parking lot on his motorcycle and stared at the agents
(R. 79:14,29). As he left the parking lot and returned to the house, defendant failed
to stop at a stop sign and signaled incorrectly (R. 79:14-15, 30).
After a couple of minutes in the house, defendant again returned to his
motorcycle and drove off (R. 79:15, 30). Agent Johnson followed defendant (R.
79:17,30). Defendant turned right at a red light without signaling and without first
stopping at the light (R. 79:31). He stopped his motorcycle in the traffic lane after
completing the turn and glanced back at Agent Johnson (R. 79-31). Defendant then
continued on his way (R. 79:31).
Agent Johnson activated his emergency lights and pulled defendant over (R.
79:31). As Agent Johnson and defendant were talking on the sidewalk, agents Weiss
and Grogan arrived (R. 79:34). Agent Weiss noticed a large sheath knife on
defendant's side, which he removed with defendant's permission (R. 79:17, 34).
Defendant also handed over a four-inch butterfly knife that was in his back pocket
(R. 79:17, 34). An additional large sheath knife was found attached to defendant's
motorcycle (R. 79:17, 35).
The agents decided to arrest defendant in lieu of issuing a citation (R. 79:1718,33). Agent Grogan later testified that he had no reason to suspect that defendant
4

would not show up to court on a citation (R. 79:25). He stated, however, that he
usually arrests people rather than a-u- them if they "commit numerous traffic
violations" (R. 79:24-25).
-V> soon as the agents indicated that they were going to arrest defendant -or

continued to try to back up (R. 79:18). As the other agents handcuffed defendai it,
Agent Johnson noticed a large bulge in the waistband of defendant's pants (R. 79:18,
T^V Agent Johnson feared it might be a weapon ,\no informed the other agents that
defendant had ^onuAiiing m i\\^ pants ,i\
; , : • • - * .

•

*
.

le asked defendant vxlmi ^ r
, i began ^ : urfc,L;ii:.g

trvimT to conceal the bulge fR. 79:34). Defendant also tried to drop lo the ground [R.
79:18). '
Agent Johnson unbuckled defendant's belt and removed a black pouch from
/,x-> ,-, .;i:*.iL\r.id .Wv.i .«* . *• .

• ••

-ii^iui Lie j.--vMiv^ were two glass pipes and a

rylimler tube v iilllli i lh'ilMMI

iii llii HIIIIIII mini I nin iill i c n l u r insitli IN

"" l11'1 »dl

Agent Johnson ^^Hrnizod tho objects as pipes for smoking metham phetam ii l e (R
79:36). He also discovered two bags of methamphetamine and a bag of marijuana
(R. 79:19, 36).
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) (repealed 2005) did not limit an
officer's authority to arrest a misdemeanor traffic offender. It merely prescribed
post-arrest procedures guaranteeing the offender a quick appearance before a
magistrate.
Even if section 41-6-166 did limit an officer's authority to arrest for a
misdemeanor traffic offense, defendant's arrest and the search incident thereto were
still lawful. By resisting the allegedly unlawful arrest, defendant committed a new,
distinct crime of resisting arrest. This new crime gave officers probable cause to
arrest defendant, and the subsequent search was therefore lawful.

6

ARGUMENT
I. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-166 DID NOT LIMIT A POLICE
OFFICER'S AUTHORITY TO ARREST FOR A TRAFFIC
VIOLATION; IT MERELY PRESCRIBED POST-ARREST
PROCEDURES
Defendant asserts Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) (repealed 2005)
restricted an officer's authority to arrest for a traffic violation to the four
circumstances listed in that statute. Br. Aplt. at 4. He claims that because none of
the circumstances were present at his arrest, the officers had no authority to arrest
him and that their search of his person incident to arrest was therefore unlawful. Br.
Aplt. at 4. Defendant's claim is meritless.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that arrests for misdemeanor traffic
violations are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Atwater v. City ofLago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318,354 (2001). It remains the prerogative of the legislature, however,
to restrict an officer's authority to arrest misdemeanor offenders. Thus, defendant's
claim is strictly one of statutory interpretation—did section 41-6-166 limit an
officer's authority to arrest for misdemeanor traffic violations? This Court reviews
that question for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. See State
v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, f 11,37 P.3d 1103.
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate
the Legislature's intent.'" State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (citation
omitted). The Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain
7

language of the statute. Id. If possible, the statutory language should be given a
literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the
plain language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look further. See Visitor
Auth. Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Div., 930 P.2d 1196,1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the
statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the
uncertain facts of legislative history/'); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v.
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
construction." (citation and quotations omitted)). A reviewing court should not add
or subtract statutory terms. See Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854 F.Supp. 838, 841 (D. Utah
1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its
very language, and if it is straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its
terms. Its words then bear 'their original meaning and the statute is not to be read
so as to add or subtract from [that] which is stated ...'" Gardener v. Chrysler Corp.,
89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 stated the following:
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act
punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of
setting bond, shall in the following cases, be taken without unnecessary
delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of
such offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the
place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases:
8

(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance
before a magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in Section 41-6-44.
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in
the event of an accident causing death, personal injuries, or damage to
property.
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his
written promise to appear in court as hereinafter provided, or when in
the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise to appear is
insufficient.
By its plain language, the statute only applied "[wjhenever any person is
arrested/7 Id. Additionally, the four conditions in the statute applied "[w]hen the
person is arrested/7 Id. The statute thus assumed that an arrest had already
occurred. Moreover, the statute stated that its procedures exist "for the purpose of
setting bond/ 7 Id. Thus, the statute's directives did not govern when police may
arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation. They governed when and how police
may seek a bond in lieu of a promise to appear before releasing an arrested suspect.
Consideration of other statutes governing arrests and misdemeanor traffic
violations supports this construction. Blanket authority for police to arrest a
misdemeanor suspect is found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (West 2004), which
states the following:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
9

(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence
of any peace officer; 'presence 7 includes all of the physical senses or
any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any
physical sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses

"The

term

'public

offense'

under

section

77-7-2(1)

generally

includes

misdemeanors." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, % 29,57 P.3d 1052. Violations of chapter
six of the traffic code are class C misdemeanors unless otherwise indicated. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-12(1) (West 2004) ("A violation of any provision of this
chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided."). Traffic violations
thus constitute a "public offense" for which officers may arrest a person under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1), unless prohibited by a more specific statute. 2
Section 41-6-166 was not that more specific statute. It was part of a statutory
scheme that governed police procedure following an arrest for a misdemeanor
traffic violation. Section 166 states that police must take an arrested suspect to "the
nearest or most accessible" magistrate to set bond in four circumstances: (1) when
the suspect requests it; (2) when the suspect is arrested for driving under the
influence; (3) when the suspect is arrested for fleeing the scene of an accident; and
(4) when the person refuses to sign the promise to appear described in section 167 or

2

The legislature renumbered the traffic code in the 2005 legislative session.
See 2005 Utah Laws 11-208. Most of the traffic code is now found in chapter 6a of
title 41.
10

the officer believes that promise to appear will be insufficient. See Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-166. It dovetails with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-167 (West 2004), which describes
the procedures for releasing a suspect without taking him before a magistrate.3 That
section states, in part, the following:
(1) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor,
whenever a person is [not] immediately taken before a magistrate as
hereinbefore provided, the peace officer shall prepare, in triplicate or
more copies, a written notice to appear in court...

(4) (a) In order to secure release as provided in this section, the
arrested person shall promise to appear in court by signing at least one
copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer.
(b) The arresting officer shall immediately:
(i) deliver a copy of the notice to the person promising to appear; and
(ii) release the person arrested from custody.
(5) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section shall be:
(a) guilty of misconduct in office; and
(b) subject to removal from office.

3

The legislature renumbered section 41-6-167 in the 2005 legislative session.
It is now found in section 77-7-24. See 2005 Utah Laws 203.
11

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-167 (West 2004).4
Neither of these sections purported to limit the authority found in section 777-2(1) for an officer to arrest misdemeanor offenders.

To the contrary, they

contemplated that an officer may arrest a traffic offender, transport him to the police
station, photograph him, fingerprint him, and then arraign him before a magistrate
or release him with a promise to appear. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169 (West 2004)
(repealed 2005) confirmed this interpretation. It stated that sections 166 and 167
"shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without warrant for violations of
this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive of any
other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an
offense of like grade/ 7 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169 (emphasis added). In other
words, section 77-7-2(1) still applies to misdemeanor traffic violations.
The Utah Supreme Court has also suggested that section 166 was properly
construed as governing police procedure post-arrest, In Woytko v. Browning, 659
P.2d 1058,1060 (Utah 1983), it noted that the section 41-6-166 serves two purposes.

4

The word "not" inserted in brackets was included in the original bill
enacting section 41-6-167, but was omitted in the engrossed bill. Compare 1941 Utah
Laws 149 with 1949 Utah Laws 186. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
the only rational view of the statute is that it applies when a suspect is not
immediate^ taken before a magistrate. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1200 n.6
(Utah 1995).
12

"First, it preserves the rights of a person arrested by insuring that he be afforded a
prompt opportunity to effect his release from custody/' Id. "Second, it prevents the
arresting officer from being selective in determining before which magistrate the
charge will be lodged and tried." Id. Thus, the statute enumerates the rights of
arrested suspects to a speedy, impartial arraignment before a magistrate. It does
not, as defendant claims, limit the authority granted officers by section 77-7-2 to
arrest misdemeanor traffic offenders. Accordingly, defendant's arrest was proper,
and the trial court correctly denied his motion to suppress.
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS RESISTANCE TO
ARREST CONSTITUTED A NEW, DISTINCT CRIME FOR WHICH
OFFICERS ARRESTED AND SEARCHED HIM
Even if this Court were to hold that defendant's arrest was improper under
section 41-6-166, it should nevertheless affirm the trial court because defendant
resisted arrest, creating a new, distinct crime for which officers lawfully arrested
and searched him.5
Evidence seized following an unlawful arrest or detention is normally
excluded from the subsequent criminal trial as fruit of the illegal arrest. See Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). Utah courts have recognized an

5

Although this argument was not raised by the State below, this Court may
affirm the trial court on any ground apparent in the record. See State v. Hechtle, 2004
UT App 96, \ 17 n.4, 89 P.3d 185.
13

exception to the rule, however, where the suspect's response to the illegal arrest or
detention is itself a new crime that gives officers cause to arrest and search the
suspect. See State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003,1008-09 (Utah 1997) (holding that Griego
was lawfully arrested for assault on an officer even though assault was in response
to illegal entry into his home); State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311,1312-13 (Utah App.
1993) (holding that where officers illegally seized defendant and his marijuana,
evidence that defendant swallowed marijuana was nevertheless admissible at trial
for evidence tampering).
Other jurisdictions to consider the question have also held that when the
suspect's response to the illegal arrest or detention is itself a new crime, it gives
officers cause to lawfully arrest and search the suspect. See United States v. Sprinkle,
106 F.3d 613, 619 (4th Cir. 1997) (admitting evidence where, after unlawful Terry
stop, defendant assaulted police officers with a firearm); United States v. Dawdy, 46
F.3d 1427,1431 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[Assuming arguendo that [the officer's initial stop
and arrest of Dawdy were invalid, Dawdy's resistance provided independent
grounds for his arrest, and the evidence discovered in the subsequent searches of his
person . . . is admissible); United States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192,1196 (7th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to suppress evidence that Pryor used a false social security number where
he provided officers with false personal information during an illegal detention);
United States v. Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Evidence of a
14

separate, independent crime initiated against police officers in their presence after
an illegal entry or arrest will not be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.");
United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230,1235 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that border
patrol agent's illegal entry into suspect's car did not taint subsequent search of
suspect where, before search, suspect illegally fled inspection area); United States v.
King, 724 F.2d 253, 256 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that officer's illegal traffic stop did
not taint subsequent search where suspects, in response to illegal stop, assaulted
officer); United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1016-17 (11th Cir. 1983)
("[Notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between lawless police
conduct and a defendant's response, if the defendant's response is itself a new,
distinct crime, the police constitutionally may arrest the defendant for that crime.");
United States v. Marine, 51 M.J. 425, (C.A.A.F. 1999) (refusing to suppress marijuana
cigarette seized from solider who, during illegal detention, violated military law by
disrespecting an officer); Commonwealth v. King, 449 N.E.2d 1217,1226 (Mass. 1983)
(refusing to suppress evidence seized where suspect shot at officers during an illegal
traffic stop); State v. Nelson, 519 S.E.2d 786,790 (S.C. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that
officer's initial unlawful attempt to stop suspect became lawful when suspect
committed traffic infractions); Woodson v. Commw., 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (Va. 1993)
(refusing to suppress cocaine and marijuana seized during stop that was initially
illegal but during which suspect assaulted police officer).
15

United States v. Bailey is illustrative of this principal and analogous to the
instant case. Bailey was detained by narcotics agents in the Atlanta, Georgia airport
on suspicion of drug trafficking. Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1011. Before the agents could
transport Bailey for questioning, Bailey fled custody. Id. at 1012. One of the agents
pursued Bailey and caught him. Id. The two engaged in a fistfight and a struggle
for possession of the agent's firearm. Id. Aft,er subduing Bailey, the officer searched
him and discovered a large sum of money and quantities of cocaine and heroin. Id.
On appeal to the eleventh circuit, Bailey claimed that the money and drugs were
fruit of the illegal detention in the airport. Id. at 1013. The court disagreed and held
that police lawfully arrested defendant for a new distinct crime. Id. at 1016-17. It
explained, "[Notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between lawless
police conduct and a defendant's response, if the defendant's response is itself a
new, distinct crime, the police constitutionally may arrest the defendant for that
crime." Id.
The Bailey court also found substantial policy considerations supporting an
exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a suspect commits an
new crime during an unlawful stop. "A contrary rule would virtually immunize a
defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient
causal connection to the police misconduct." Id. at 1017. "[Extending the fruits
doctrine to immunize a defendant from arrest for new crimes gives a defendant an
16

intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts so long as they are
sufficiently connected to the chain of causation started by the police misconduct/7
Id. Extending the fruits doctrine to new crimes committed during an unlawful
detention would allow suspects to resist arrest, assault officers, and even murder
officers with impunity, so long as the initial detention was unlawful.
In the instant case, even assuming arguendo that the initial arrest was invalid,
defendant's resistance to the arrest was a new, distinct crime for which officers
arrested and searched him. Defendant has no right to resist an arrest, even an
unlawful one. See State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568,573-74 (Utah 1991) (holding that
common law right to resist unlawful arrest had been abolished by legislature in
favor of statutory scheme that prohibited assault upon a police officer acting within
the scope of his duty). Accordingly, the agents search of defendant after he resisted
arrest was lawful.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Respectfully submitted September 14,2005.
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Addenda

Addendum A

§ 4 1 - 6 - 1 6 6 . Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor—Setting bond
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this a c t l punishable as a
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the
following cases, be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within
the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and
who has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most accessible with
reference to the place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a
magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
combination thereof as prescribed in Section 41-6-44.
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event
of an accident causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property.
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written
promise to appear in court as hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of
the arresting officer, a written promise to appear is insufficient.
Laws 1941, c. 52, § 149; Laws 1975, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 7, § 1; Laws 1979, c. 242, § 72;
Laws 1992, c. 30, § 88.
Codifications C. 1943, § 57-7-226.
1
Laws 1941, c. 52 that enacted this chapter.

Addendum B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDENDEPARTMENT, STATE O F U T ^ H ' U " : - I

RULING

STATE OF UTAH,

A C: 31~

DE

Plaintiff,
vs,
MICHAEL LEROY MARTINEZ,

Judge John R. Morris
Case No. 041904034

Defendant.

This case is before the court on a motion to suppress.
FACTS
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force agents Grogen and Johnson testified at the suppression
hearing.
On the night of June 16,2004, Agents Grogen and Johnson were conducting surveillance of
an Ogden house following complaints of drug trafficking. The agents set up in a school parking lot
across the street from the house with two other agents. The agents were not in uniform and each
drove an unmarked vehicle.
During the course of the evening, the agents observed Martinez leave the house under
surveillance on a motorcycle. Martinez crossed the street to the parking lot, circled the agents, then
committed several traffic violations while returning to the house, namely, failing to stop at a stop
sign and giving a right hand turn signal while turning left.
After several minutes, Martinez left the house a second time and proceeded to drive the
motorcycle eastbound on Harrison Boulevard. Agent Johnson followed, and observed further traffic
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violations by Martinez-failing to stop pursuant to a traffic control device and turning without
signaling- at the intersection of 20th Street and Harrison Boulevard.
Agent Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Martinez stopped the motorcycle and dismounted.
Shortly thereafter, Agents Grogen and Weiss arrived at the scene. Agent Johnson stepped away to
check for a valid license and registration and outstanding warrants. Agent Grogen informed Martinez
that he was under arrest for the observed traffic violations. Martinez backed up as though attempting
to get away, but was restrained and handcuffed by Agents Grogen and Weiss.
Believing that his assistance in restraining Martinez might be needed, Agent Johnson reapproached Mairtinez, Grogen and Weiss. Agent Johnson observed a large bulge in the front
waistband area of Martinez pants. When initially stopped, Martinez had been carrying a large sheath
knife and a butterfly knife. Agent Johnson asked Martinez what was in his pants. Agent Johnson
testified that he was concerned that the bulge might be a concealed weapon. Martinez began to
struggle and made an effort to hide the bulge from view. Agent Johnson searched Martinez and
removed a black case or pouch from Martinez' waistband area, which was found to contain drug
paraphernalia and substances appearing to be marijuana and methamphetamine.
Martinez was subsequently booked and charged by information with, among other things,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iii).
ANALYSIS
Martinez asks the court to suppress the evidence obtained upon search on the ground that a
peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation is limited by Utah Code Ann.
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§§41-6-166,-167 and -169. Martinez also argues that the arrest was improper since it was motivated
by the agents' desire to search Martinez and his motorcycle, and that an arrest for a misdemeanor
traffic violation should fail on Fourth Amendment grounds.
A peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation
was raised but not decided in State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Harmon, the Utah
Supreme Court determined that sections 166 and 167 apply only to arrests for violations of title 41,
chapter 6, and therefore did not apply to the violation for which Harmon was arrested. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for
misdemeanor speeding violations without examination of section 41-6-166. United States v. Lugo,
170 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1999).
Statutory Authority to Arrest
Martinez asserts that a peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation
is limited by sections 41-6-166, -167 and -169. Those sections provide:
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor-Setting bond.
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this [chapter 6]1 punishable as a
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases, be
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged
is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most
accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in
Section 41-6-44.
1

"... the reference to 'this act' should now properly be read 'this chapter,' meaning chapter 6."
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1201.
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(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property.
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear
in court as hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise
to appear is insufficient.
41-6-167. Notice to appear in court-Contents-Promise to compIy-Signing-Release from
custody -Official misconduct.
(1) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, whenever a person is [not]2
immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided, the peace officer shall prepare, in
triplicate or more copies, a written notice to appear in court containing:
(a) the name and address of the person;
(b) the number, if any, of the person's operator's license;
(c) the registration number of the person's vehicle;
(d) the offense charged; and
(e) the time and place the person shall appear in court.
(2) The time specified in the notice to appear must be at least five days after the arrest of the
person unless the person demands an earlier hearing.
(3) The place specified in the notice to appear shall be made before a magistrate of competent
jurisdiction in the county in which the alleged violation occurred.
(4) (a) In order to secure release as provided in this section, the arrested person shall promise
to appear in court by signing at least one copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer.
(b) The arresting officer shall immediately:
(i) deliver a copy of the notice to the person promising to appear; and

"The word cnot5 was included in the original 1941 bill but was accidentally omitted when the
bill was enrolled. See 1941 Utah Laws 139; 1949 Utah Laws 186. We have previously held that
'the only logical reading of the statute is that it has application only when a citation is issued in
lieu of an arrest and no appearance is made before a magistrate.' Woytko v. Browning, 659 P.2d
1058, 1061 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute should read 'whenever a person is
not immediately taken before a magistrate.'" Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1200, fn 6.
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(ii) release the person arrested from custody.
(5) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section shall be:
(a) guilty of misconduct in office; and
(b) subject to removal from office.
41-6-169. Arrests without warrants.
The foregoing provisions of this act shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without
warrant for violations of this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive
of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of
like grade.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-166, -167, 169.
Martinez contends that arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations are authorized in only the
four specific circumstances enumerated in section 166: (1) when the person arrested demands to see
a magistrate, (2) when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance,
(3) when arrested for hit and run, or (4) when the person arrested refuses to sign the promise to
appear contained in the citation or when, in the discretion of the officer, the written promise to
appear is insufficient.
For all misdemeanor traffic violations not within these four circumstances, Martinez argues
that section 169 gives peace officers authority only to issue a citation under section 167, after which
the suspect must be released.
However, neither sections 166,167,169 nor the other provisions of title 41, chapter 6 confer
arrest authority on peace officers. That authority is found in Utah's general statute governing arrests,
which provides that "a peace officer ... may, without warrant, arrest a person:... (I) for any public
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offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer...." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, the authority to issue citations for misdemeanor traffic violations (other than
parking violations under section 41-6-19.5) is not found in those sections or anywhere in chapter 6.
That authority is also found in the general arrest statute: "A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person
into custody ... may issue and deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution
on a misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the
person should be taken pursuant to law if the person had been arrested." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-18
(emphasis added).
Sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18 are both written in the permissive voice "may," and confer
authority on peace officers to arrest a suspect for any "public offense" committed in their presence
or, in the peace officer's discretion, to cite the suspect for any "misdemeanor or infraction" for which
the suspect would otherwise be subject to arrest or prosecution.
It is uncontested that Martinez committed multiple misdemeanor traffic violations in the
agents' presence. Therefore, the agents were statutorily authorized to arrest or cite Martinez in their
discretion under sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18.
Addressing Martinez' argument, the court must determine whether or not in certain
circumstances sections 166, 167 and 169 limit the general authority of a peace office to arrest, or
require the issuance of a citation instead of an arrest for a traffic misd emeanor. " . . . 41 -6-169 mkes
[sic] it clear that the officer must make an arrest or issue a citation pursuant to the [sic] 41-6-166 and
41-6-167." (Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2). The court concludes they do not.
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In construing sections 166,167 and 169, the "primary rule ... is to give effect to the intent of
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we
look first to the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, we assume that each term in the
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66.
Moreover, u[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions
in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT
12, ^ 17. "It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and effect.
When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to
construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770,773
(Utah 1991).
Sections 166, 167 and 169 presuppose that an arrest has taken place. Section 166 applies
"[wjhenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor." That
section describes the procedure to be followed for appearance and setting bond once an arrest has
been made: the arrested person "shall... be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate" in
the enumerated circumstances.
Section 167 further describes the post arrest procedure to be followed "whenever a person is
[not] immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided." The phrase "as hereinbefore
provided" can only refer to section 166, and the phrase "as hereinafter provided" in section 166(4)
can only refer to section 167. Read together, sections 166 and 167 impose a procedural requirement
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that persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic violations be taken to a magistrate "without
unnecessary delay" or, where not so taken before a magistrate, given a citation and released.
Section 169 requires that sections 166 and 167 be followed for warrantless arrests for traffic
misdemeanor violations under chapter 6. Specifically, section 169 imposes "the procedure prescribed
herein"-i.e., the post arrest procedures contained in sections 166 and 167-where not in conflict with
other law.
For these reasons, the court reads sections 166, 167 and 169 as procedural rules for peace
officers to follow once an arrest has been made for misdemeanor traffic violations under chapter 6,
containing neither a grant of limited authority to arrest without warrant nor a restriction or limitation
of any such authority. Those sections are consistent with, and do not supersede, conflict with or
restrict a peace officer's general authority to make a warrantless arrest for any public offense
committed or attempted in the officer's presence under section 77-7-2.
The agents' statutory authority to arrest Martinez was not restricted or limited by sections
166,167 and 169. The arrest was therefore valid and the subsequent search was a search incident to
arrest.
Reasonableness of the Arrest
Martinez also raises issues under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, which
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "He had a valid driver's license and there were no
warrants for his arrest and was a resident of Ogden but the officers did not even attempt to issue a
citation but instead arrested the Martinez solely for the purpose of searching him and his motorcycle
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and therefore the arrest was illegal and the evidence obtained should be suppressed." Defendant's
Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof, p. 2.
Martinez' first constitutional argument is that the "pretext doctrine" should invalidate his
arrest. That doctrine was rejected in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) (in the case of
temporary stops for traffic violations); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.
Ct. 476,126 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1993) (arrest for parole violation; however, the pretext doctrine was not
squarely before the court); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (traffic stop and subsequent
arrest of a passenger for giving false personal information to a peace officer), and State v. Harmon,
910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) (traffic violation outside chapter 6).
"In attempting to apply the pretext doctrine, [defendant] argues that her arrest was
unconstitutional because even if she 'could' have been arrested for driving on suspension, a
reasonable officer ... 'would' not have done so. After considering our opinions in Lopez, Archuleta,
and Pena, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, we conclude that the 'pretext arrest' analysis
should be rejected for many of the same reasons that we rejected the 'pretext stop' analysis. The
validity of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not on an officer's subjective motivations
or suspicions. Inquiring into 'what a reasonable officer would do' focuses on a question that is
falsely objective, 'fails to provide the consistency and predictability officers need,' and ignores the
possibility that usual police practice may be unconstitutional." Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 (citations
omitted).
"If police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their
subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. ... In other words, if
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the alleged prelext arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's
involvement in amother crime, then the arrest is lawful.... The arrest was not rendered invalid solely
because the officers had a separate motive for arresting him ... ." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1238.
Martinez5 second constitutional argument is directed to the reasonableness of his arrest.
Martinez concedes that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation
despite a Fourth Amendment challenge in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). "The State
has correctly stated the law under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the
State of Utah can interpret its constitution to provide more protection from the government then [sic]
the United States Constitution provides, [citations omitted] Also, the legislature of the State of Utah
is free to provide greater protection then [sic] is provided by the U.S. Constitution and that is exactly
what 41-6-166 does by limiting when the police can arrest a person for a violation of a traffic
offense." Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2. Martinez attempts to distinguish Atwater "since Texas law
provided the officer the right to arrest for that violation." Id.
The court does not find that Martinez' arrest was unreasonable under the Utah Constitution.
"In Lopez, we concluded that 'because the pretext doctrine is unsound, we refuse to adopt it under
article I, section 14 . . . of the Utah Constitution.' This holding also applies to pretext arrests."
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 (citation omitted).
In consl ruing statutes, the court will "avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant
constitutional mandates." State v. Mohl 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995) "[W]e have a duty to
construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts." Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120,1125
(Utah 1990).
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Under section 77-7-2, the agents had probable cause and authority to arrest Martinez for
observed misdemeanor traffic violations. The court interprets sections 166,167 and 169 as imposing
additional procedural requirements in connection with such arrests. Such procedures address possible
abuses of a peace officer's discretionary arrest authority.
"The purpose of the statute [chapter 6] is two-fold. First, it preserves the rights of a person
arrested by insuring that he be afforded a prompt opportunity to effect his release from custody.
Second, it prevents the arresting officer from being selective in determining before which magistrate
the charge will be lodged and tried." Woytko, 659 P.2d at 1060 (Utah 1983).
The reasonableness of warrantless arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations is therefore
addressed, and Martinez' rights are preserved, in the procedures applicable to such arrests as enacted
by the legislature in chapter 6, and specifically in sections 166,167 and 169. Accordingly, the court
declines to invalidate arrests under the general arrest statute as applied to misdemeanor traffic
violations, or to impose additional procedures or analysis on such arrests.
CONCLUSION
Martinez' motion to suppress is denied.
Dated November 29, 2004.

, WVfr-v-—^
R. Morris :, Judge
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